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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal
Declaratory

is

Judgment

Plaintiffs.

The

jurisdiction

from

the Court's Memorandum

granting

Supreme

Summary

Court

of

the

Decision

Judgment
State

of

and

for

the

Utah

has

to hear this Appeal under Utah Code Ann.

§78-2-

2(3)(i) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Director of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for
payment issued by the Division of State Lands.

The Plaintiff

filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Director's
decision.

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment and entered

a Judgment reversing the decision of the

Director.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
(1)

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

entering

Summary

Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust asset for less than
full

value

in

view

of

Federal

and

State

constitutional

law

governing school trust lands?
(2)

Whether

the

plain

language

of

the

lease

may

be

rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous?
(3)

Whether

Plaintiff

should

be

barred

from

using

doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school
trust fund when it was Plaintiff's duty to report and pay the
correct amount of royalties?
1

the

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Enabling Act, §6:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirtysix in every township of said proposed state, and where
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said
State for the support of common schools....
Utah Enabling Act §10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for the
support of said schools, and such land shall not be
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for
school purposes only.
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be
safely invested and held by the State; and the income
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges,
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming
Sections 5 and 7).
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people,
2

to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
30 U.S.C. §207(a):
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by
underground mining operations....
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2:
2.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from
a surface mine.
3.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5% if conditions warrant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under
its coal leases on school trust lands.

One of those leases was

held by Plaintiff, Blackhawk Coal Company.

Demand was made to

Plaintiff to pay royalties found by the audit to have been
3

underpaid.

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the auditors tc

the Director of the Division of State Lands.

The Director, after

a hearing, upheld the audit and the demand for payment. (R.433)
Plaintiff then filed this action in the Seventh Judicial District
Court asking for a declaration that the State could not collect
the unpaid royalties.
Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff

filed a Motion

for Partial

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment finding that Plaintiff owed nothing to
the State. (Addenda 1 and 2)

It is from those Orders that this

appeal is taken.
The

United

States, pursuant

to

the Utah

Enabling Act,

granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of
the

common

schools.

The

State holds the

land as trustee.

Management of those lands is by the Board of State Lands and the
Division of State Lands.

Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14.

On February 16, 19 60 the State issued to Carbon Development
Company coal lease no. 18148. (Addendum 3)

The lease authorizes

extraction of coal from school trust lands located in Carbon
County, Utah.
produced

in

The

lease

commercial

is perpetual, as
quantities,

with

long as coal is
a

adjustment at the end of each 20-year period.

provision

for

The lease was

assigned to the Plaintiff.
The United States Government owns most of the coal-producing
lands within the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty charged
on federal coal leases generally becomes the prevailing market
4

royalty rate for coal leases within the State.
no.

18148 was

issued

by the

When State lease

State, the royalty

federal coal leases was $.15 per ton.

rate on many

The paragraph (Article III

Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the subject State
lease requires Lessees:
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United State at that time,
whichever is higher....
State lease no. 18148 also requires the Plaintiff to prepare
and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified statement as
to the amount of production together with other information as
required by the State Land

Board.

(Article III, Third)

The

State also retained the right to go upon the premises and conduct
audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI)
The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at
$.15 per ton until August 4, 1976.
Coal

Leasing Amendments

enacted by Congress.

Act

of

On August 4, 1976 the Federal

1976, 30 U.S.C.

§§201-209 was

The Act and the regulations promulgated

thereunder, increased the royalty rate on surface mines to 12
1/2% of the value of the coal produced and the royalty rate on
underground mines to 8% of the value of the coal produced.
5

Between January 1, 1979 and the audit, twenty-four

(24) coa

leases were issued by the United States Bureau of Land Managemenl
on lands within the State of Utah. (R.315, 415, 441)

Nineteer

(19) of those leases required a royalty payment of 8% of the
value of coal. (R.315, 415, 441)

Only one required a royalty

rate of less than 8% and that royalty rate was 5% of the value of
the coal.

The adjoining States of Colorado, Wyoming and New

Mexico have all increased their royalty rate to at least 8% of
gross sales value of the coal extracted. (R.423, 425, 431)
Plaintiff

was

fully

aware

of

the

Federal

Coal

Leasing

Amendments Act and the increase in the federal royalty rate.
Plaintiff had this knowledge from the leasing of federal lands
and litigation involving the increased royalty rate on federal
coal leases held by Plaintiff. (R.397, 399)
Coal Company IBLA 82-519.
in the
located.
ton.

Price River

See also Blackhawk

Plaintiff also holds 11 federal leases

Complex

where

state

lease no. 18148 is

Four of those leases have a royalty rate of $.12.5 per

Those leases were issued in the 1930's and 1950's.

Six of

the leases have a royalty of 8% and one has a royalty of 10.4%.
Those leases were either issued or adjusted after passage of the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976. (R.396)
In 1981 the State of Utah notified Plaintiff that the State
intended

to adjust

state

lease no. 18148.

included an increase in the royalty rate.

The

adjustments

Plaintiff objected and

argued that the request for readjustment was not timely. (R.280)
6

The

Land

Board,

delayed

after

enforcement

a hearing,
of

the

upheld

adjustment

the

adjustments

until

the

but

Attorney

General's office decided whether the request for adjustment was
timely, (R.280)

This question was being litigated in the federal

courts,

Coal

Rosebud

Sales

Company

vs. Andrus,

667

F.2d

949

(1982), therefore the Attorney General's office deferred issuing
an opinion until the federal courts settled the question.
1983

Plaintiff

pursued

by

ceased

production

the State.

The

so

the

royalties

adjustment

sought

to be

was

In
not

collected

accrued prior to the last quarter of 1983. (R.303)
The

lands that

the

thousands of mineral

Division

leases.

funds or the personnel

State Lands manages have

The Division does not have the

to monitor each

received on those leases. (R.433)
written

of

lease or the payments

Instead the State of Utah, as

in its lease provisions and regulations, requires

its

lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the correct
amounts of royalties. (Addendum 3)

Like reporting taxes, it has

largely been an honor reporting system.

In 1981 the Utah State

Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. (R.412,
433)

Richard Mitchell was hired. (R.412)

He set up an auditing

procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases.
(R.412)
auditors,

In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two
Douglas

E.

Johnson

and

(R.415, 427)
7

Ralph

Aiello,

were

hired.

In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the Stat*
coal leases.
of

Land

Management

examination
records.

The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureai

of

the

records

on

federal

Plaintiff's

The auditors

and

coal

other

leases

State

coal

and ar
lessee

found that the coal lessees had, in

certain instances, under reported production and failed to report
other vital information.

They also found that the royalty rate

on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning in 1977 but
the Plaintiff had failed to report and pay royalties at the
prevailing federal rate. (R.415, 4272)
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division
of State Lands. (R.303, 415, 427)
of State Lands established
auditors7

report.

an audit committee to review the

The committee reviewed the lease and the

findings of the report.

Some adjustments were made to the report

and it was approved. (R.415, 433)
the

Plaintiff

The Director of the Division

with

a request

The report was then sent to

for payment

of the delinquent

royalties together with interest.
The Plaintiff, upon receipt of the audit report, requested a
hearing before the Director of the Division of State Lands. A
hearing was held.

The Director rejected the appeal and upheld

the findings of the auditors. (R.433)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the
8

pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

This Court

should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Defendants, Durham

vs. Margetts, 571 P. 2d

1332 at 1334

(Utah

1977), and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there
is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
vs. Holcombe, 740 P.2d 281 at 283 (Utah 1987).

Briggs

This Court, in

reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the trial
court.

Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225

at 229 (Utah 1987) .
The
Plaintiff

issues
by

before

the

the

Director

Court
of

have

State

been

Lands.

decided
The

against

Court, when

reviewing the decision of the Director, should not override the
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and
regulations unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous.

This

Court should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in
excess of his powers in upholding the audit.

McKnight vs. State

Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 at 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield
Company vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case
are issues of law.

The Defendants maintain that when the issues

of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a
9

matter of law.
issues

of

Defendants maintain, however, that there are

fact

in

dispute

judgment for the Plaintiff.

which

preclude

entry

of summary

Defendants request that this Court

review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

State

of

Utah,

as

a

condition

of

statehood,

acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common
schools.

The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain

full value from the disposition of those lands.

The trial court

placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from
those lands to $.15 per ton rather than allowing the State to
collect the contractually required market rate of 8% of value of
the coal.
2.

The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and

should be given its plain meaning.

The requirement that the

Plaintiff periodically determine whether the federal royalty rate
has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate does
not create an ambiguity.

Such provisions are common in

long-term leases to insure that the parties pay according to
prevailing market terms.

In this case, a fluctuating royalty

rate is constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund
receives full value for its lands.
10

3.

The Court should use rules of construction to clarify

any ambiguity

in the lease.

The trial court erred when it

rewrote the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $.15 per ton.
Not even the Plaintiff claims that the royalty rate should always
remain at $.15 per ton.

The lease should be construed to give

meaning to all its provisions including subparagraph (b) of the
royalty provision which provides for increases in the royalty
rate.
4.

Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the

trust fund from receiving full value for its assets.
Enabling

Act

requires

the

trust

to

receive

The Utah

full value and

requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental
capacity.

To allow estoppel in this case would violate those

constitutional

requirements and would cost the trust fund in

excess of three million dollars.
5.

The Plaintiff has suffered no injury, was aware of the

facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the duty
to pay the correct royalties.

The State is only asking that the

Plaintiff pay what is required by the lease.
should not be estopped.

11

Such a request

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE.
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in
question are school trust lands.
and the other

The interpretation of the lease

issues that were before the trial court were

subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act,
Constitutional

provisions

and

case

law.

The

trial

court

erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands.
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine
the

case

law which

the

trial

court should

have applied in

deciding this case.
A

«
The Historical
Perspective.

Background

Provides

Essential

Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and
institutions.
1981].

L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed.

In Utah vs. Kleepe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd

on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the
purpose of the school land grants:
There were no federal lands within the borders of the
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of
the lands within their borders were subject to
taxation, including taxation necessary for the
12

maintenance of their public school systems. When other
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their
territorial
confines were
"carved" from federal
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by
the United States within those territorial confines
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the
United States created serious impediment to the "public
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax
base necessary to permit these states to operate and
maintain essential government services, including the
public school systems. It was in recognition thereof,
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly
admitted states with that of the original thirteen
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land
grant statutes.
The specific purpose was to create a
binding permanent trust which would generate financial
aid to support the public school systems of the "public
land" states.
Id. at 758.
The Utah Enabling Act granted four (4) sections of land in
each

township

for

the

Enabling

Act

§6.

accepted

those lands

The

support
State

of
of

the

common

Utah,

in

schools.

its

Utah

Constitution,

in trust for the respective purposes for

which they had been granted.

Constitution of Utah, Article XX.

B.
The Law Requires The Receipt Of Full Value From
The Disposition Of Trust Lands.
The school land grants constitute a solemn agreement between
the United States and the State of Utah.

There has been imposed

upon the State of Utah:
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted
lands for the support of public education. All revenue
from the sale or lease of the school grants was
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools.
No State could divert school lands to other public
purposes without compensating the trust for the full
market value of the interest taken.
Andrus vs. Utah. 446 U.S. 500 at 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458 at 474,
13

100 Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981).
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University
vs. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 at 274 (1852) the Supreme Court
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools.

Congress

and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust
lands so that they are not exploited

for private advantage or

depleted by State action or inaction.

Lassen vs. Arizona, 385

U.S.

458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d

515 at 522

(1967).

(While

Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that
these restrictions
school trust lands.

also apply to mineral

interests

located

in

Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 at 35 (Utah

1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295,
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 at 8 (1976).
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets:
The royalty rate set by the state is important because
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the
ground.
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling
Act and the trust concept are the most important
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty
rate.
If the rate is too low the state will be
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust.
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund,
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole.
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates.
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982).

See also Kadish vs. Arizona

State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183 at 1195 (Ariz. 1987).
14

Public

State

vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University of Alaska, 624
P.2d 807 at 813 (Alaska 1981).
To enforce this important trust purpose, the Courts have
consistently

rejected

any

State

statutes,

constitutional

provisions and Court-imposed doctrines which restrict the State
from obtaining full value from the trust lands.
Arizona

State

Land

Department,

supra, the

In Kadish vs.

Supreme

Court of

Arizona held unconstitutional an Arizona statute that fixed a
flat royalty rate for mineral leases on state school trust lands.
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and
that:
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the
people may alter or amend the trust provisions
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional
approval.
Id. at 1185.

The court said that the Enabling Act intended to

severely circumscribe the power of state government to deal with
the assets of the common school fund.

It analyzed the court

cases dealing with this subject and pointed out that:
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of
federal land grants in favor of the government.
In
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes.
Id. at 1195.
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act is State
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra.

That case dealt with the State's "in

lieu" selections of additional lands to replace lands the State
had not received pursuant to the Enabling Act.
15

The Court, after

reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development ol
trust lands, stated:
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States
and the state for the benefit of the state's public
school system.
Id. at 758.
Recent
rejected
trust.

cases

from

attempts to

other

jurisdictions

limit the

income

have

consistently

received by the school

In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb.

1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resale of school
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the
first sale.

It stated that the constitution:

imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest
price possible for all trust property it may sell.
Id. at 321.
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh, 642 P.2d
(Ok.

1981)

the

Supreme

Court

of

Oklahoma

struck

down

a

230
law

authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the
school trust fund.

In doing so the court said:

No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the
Constitution relating to such land and funds.
The
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and
disposition of the trust property.
Id. at 235.
In County of Skamania vs. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 at 582
(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber
16

from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency on the part
of timber purchases was held unconstitutional.
In Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295
at

3 05

(1976),

the

federal

government

condemned

lands including sections leased as grazing lands.

school

trust

Commenting on

the validity of a school trust leasehold made for less than fair
value, the court considered a protective provision contained in
the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act which provided against the
initial selling of lease rentals at less than fair value.

The

United States Supreme Court held that if the lease of trust lands
was for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair
value, the lease was void.
The

Courts

consistently

hold

that

entities, such

as the

Plaintiff, are charged with knowledge of the trust and are also
subject to the duty to obtain full value for the trust.

State

vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 at 1199 (Ok. 1953),
State vs. Lamacus, 263 P.2d 426 at 427
Seward,

133 NW.2d

Educational

390 at 391

Lands and

(Ok. 1953), Seidel vs.

(Neb. 1965), State vs. Board of

Funds of Nebraska,

65 NW.2d

392 at 397

(Neb. 1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 P.2d
948 at 957 (Mont. 1985).
C
Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The
Facts Of This Case.
The State of Utah has the duty to receive full market value
from

the

disposition

of

its school

trust

lands.

The

market

royalty rate on coal leases in the State of Utah is controlled
17

by

the

United

reserves.

States

Lessees

capital

which

has

require

expenditures

the vast

long-term

involved.

majority

of coa

leases because

It

would

have

of th«
been

ar

impermissible restriction on the trust assets if the State would
have set a flat $.15 per ton royalty on its long term coal
leases.

Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195.

It is equally impermissible for the court to judicially set the
royalty rate at a flat $.15 per ton.

The State therefore,

drafted an escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the
royalty provision to the prevailing federal rate.

That escalator

clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of the
lease, receive full market value.
The
provide
payments.
receives

State
for

also

implemented

interest
Those

full

and

penalties

provisions

market

rules and

value;

further

on

regulations which
delinquent

insure

otherwise,

the

that
trust

depleted as a result of the time value of money.

royalty

the

trust

would

be

Biork vs. April

Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 at 317 (Utah 1977).
The

Plaintiff,

as

a

party

dealing

with

the trust and

pursuant to the terms of the lease, had the duty to pay the
correct amount of royalty.

When an audit was performed by the

State it showed that the Plaintiff owed to the trust fund in
excess of three million dollars. (R.303)

The trial court, by

refusing to enforce the escalator provision of the lease, by
refusing to require the payment of interest on delinquent
18

royalties, and by amending the lease to limit royalties to $.15
per ton imposed constitutionally impermissible restrictions on
the trust fund.

That decision, in this case, costs the trust

fund, as of the audit, more than three million dollars with an
ongoing loss of more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after
the audit.

The contract created by the trial court runs directly

counter to the law and public policy of this State.

Thus, the

court below is in the anomalous position of having written a
contract which violates "the generally accepted doctrine of this
country that every contract in violation of law is void.11
vs. Latses, 60 Utah 38 at 44, 206 P.2d 533 at 555 (1922).

Baker
See

also. Haddock vs. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 52, 65 P. 491 (1901)
(holding void as against public policy a contract to pay fees for
service of legal processes where the fees set in the contract
were different

from the

fees set by statute) ; Boise-Payette

Lumber Company vs. Challis Independent School District, No. 1 of
Custer County, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26

(1928)

(holding that

judicial determinations of public policy must recognize and yield
to any applicable legislative enactments).
The instant case should be reversed and remanded to the
trial

court

with

instructions

that

the

escalator

clause be

enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at the
prevailing market rate of 8% of the value of the coal removed
together with interest as provided by the regulations.
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POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF DETERMINE
THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT MAKE THE
CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS.
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument
itself.

The Court should look to the entire instrument and give

meaning to all provisions.
1060

at

1061

(Utah

Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d

1981),

Hal

Taylor

Associates

America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 at 749 (Utah 1982).

vs.

Union

The trial court

erred when it ignored the plain meaning of the royalty provision
and the intent of the parties when entering into the contract and
rewrote the lease deleting the escalator provision of the royalty
clause.
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate.
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing
federal rate increases on similar lands then the royalty
increases to that new rate.

rate

The trial court was apparently under

the misconception that because the escalator clause required the
Plaintiff to determine the prevailing rate from facts outside the
lease that somehow an ambiguity was created.

Such a provision is

not defective if there is a formula or method to set the price.
Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 at 359 (Utah 1979).
Escalator clauses in long-term mineral leases are common
20

provisions.

Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation"

clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from
facts outside the body of the lease.

See e.g. Energy Reserves

Group, Inc., vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U.S. 400 at
417

(1983),

Amoco

Production

Company

vs.

Stauffer

Chemical

Company of Wyoming. 612 P.2d 463 at 468 (Wyo. 1980), Lonestar Gas
Company vs. The Howard Corporation, 556 S.W.2d 372 at 376 (Tx.
1977).

The ascertaining of facts outside the lease, to put into

effect

the

lease

provisions, does

not

create

an ambiguity.

Instead, such provisions are drafted to insure that rates, such
as royalty rates, are tied to the market price thereby protecting
both parties during the term of the lease.
The royalty provision contained in the contract provides a
formula for fixing the payment price.

Subsection

(b) of the

provision states that the royalty payment to be paid by the
Plaintiff is determined by the prevailing federal rate on lands
of similar character under coal leases issued by the federal
government.

Plaintiff had the duty to determine any change in

the federal royalty rate.

The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments

Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the
coal produced on federal coal leases.

The federal government

owns the majority of coal reserves in Utah.

Since 1979, 19 of 24

coal leases issued by the federal government in the State require
a royalty payment of 8% of value.

In addition, the adjoining

states of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have increased the
21

royalty rate to at least 8% of the value of coal produced under
their leases.

Plaintiff, in its Price River Complex, had sevei

federal leases which had been issued or adjusted since 1980. Si>
of those leases had an 8% royalty and one had a 10.4% royalty.
Those facts when applied to the royalty provision require that a
royalty rate of 8% of value be paid to the trust fund.
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate
to be paid by the Plaintiff would change when the federal royalty
rate increased.

The Plaintiff does not argue that $.15 is the

prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of similar
character and concede that the federal rate is higher than the
royalty payment they paid prior to 1976.

Plaintiff, to avoid

paying the correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is
ambiguous.

A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled

with the law governing trust lands, and the change in federal
royalty rates support only one construction of the lease.

That

construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiff must
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IMPOSED A
FLAT $,15 PER TON ROYALTY RATE.
A.
Any Ambiguous Provision Should Be Resolved By
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The
Lease.
If the Court determines there is an ambiguity in the lease
then

the

Court

should

apply

certain

rules of construction to

interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision.
not delete or rewrite the contract.
are:

(1)

the

intent

of

the

The Court should

Those rules of construction

parties

when

entering

into

the

contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank
vs. Tannerf
provision

supra at 1061; (2) existing law which affects the

is considered

part

of the

contract and governs

its

construction, Robinson vs. Joint School District, 596 P.2d 436 at
438

(Ida.

1979),

Farmers

Investment

Company

vs.

Pima

Mining

Company, 523 P.2d 487 at 489 (Az. 1974); (3) consideration should
be

given

contract

to
and

the
the

subject

matter,

motives

Fontainbleu. 405 P.2d

of

nature

the

346 at 348

and

parties,

(Utah 1965);

purpose
Nagle

of

vs.

the
Club

(4) the contract

should be viewed from the perspective of the parties at the time
it was signed, DeBouis vs. Nigh, 584 P.2d 823 at 824 (Utah 1978);
(5) the court should give the entire contract meaning and not
ignore

any

of the provisions

of the contract

or rewrite

the

contract, Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d
743 at 749

(Utah 1982) ; and

(6) the contract must be construed

liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company
23

vs.

Denver, 387 P.2d

33 at 36

(Colo. 1963), Restatement o

Contracts 2d §207.
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalt}
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct
and reasonable one.

The State, as trustee, is required to have a

royalty provision which provides a maximum value to the trust
fund.

A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions

changed is required.

To have set a flat royalty rate would have

been unconstitutional.
supra at 1195.
reserves

Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department,

The Federal Government owns the majority of coal

in the

State of Utah; therefore, the royalty rate

charged by the Federal

Government constitutes the prevailing

market rate in the State of Utah.

At the time the lease

provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15
per ton.

The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a

minimum royalty of $.15
clause

tied

to

the

per ton, but providing an escalator

prevailing

federal

royalty

rate.

The

escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of
the parties when the contract was entered into was to provide a
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market
royalty

rate

from

its

trust

lands.

When

one

ties

that

information and construction to the undisputed facts it shows
that the federal royalty rate remained at $.15 per ton until
1976.

At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act was

passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was
24

increased to 8%.

The undisputed facts show that from 1979 to the

present all newly issued federal leases in Utah, except for one,
were at the rate of 8% or greater.

The Director of State Lands

properly construed the lease to require payment of royalties at
8%.
B.
The Plaintiff Has Never Contended That The Royalty
Should Always Remain At $,15 Per Ton.
One

of

the

things

that

is

certain

about

the

royalty

provision, in addition to the plain meaning of Subsection b, is
that the contracting parties intended that the royalty rate would
change if federal royalty rates increased.
the

Court

determine

should
the

look

meaning

Plaintiff argues that

at past practices
of

the

royalty

of the parties to

provision.

The past

practices of the parties are of no benefit at all in construing
the meaning of the paragraphs involved in this case.
practice

of

the

parties,

paying

the

rate

The past

specified

under

Subparagraph a, has nothing to do with Subparagraph b which
surely must also be given effect.

The contract must be construed

to give effect to both provisions.

Hal Taylor Associates vs.

Union America, Inc., supra at 749.

The obvious problem with

Plaintiff's claim for interpretation of the royalty provision is
that it ignores Subparagraph b.

That is not interpretation, that

is selective blindness.
Plaintiff does not argue that $.15 is the prevailing federal
rate for federal leases on land of similar character under coal
leases issued by the United States during the time period covered
25

by the audit.

Its silence concedes that the rate is something

higher than $.15.

However, because Plaintiff does not like the

higher rate, Plaintiff claims ambiguity and that it should be
allowed to continue to pay at $.15 per ton as provided under
Subparagraph a.

This has nothing to do with the intent of either

party at the time of the execution of the lease.

Indeed, that

so-called interpretation flatly contradicts the parties7 intent
at

the

time

it was

signed.

In

this

particular

case the

undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8%
of

value

which

is

the

rate

Plaintiff

government on most of its other leases.

pays

to

the

federal

Any changes in the rate

can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land Management
records.
C.
State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease
Without The Land Board's Approval.
There is a difference between construing a provision and
ignoring it.

To ignore and not enforce Subparagraph b of the

royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the
terms

of

the

lease

without

the

necessary

approval

Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General.
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 at 697 (Utah 1976).

of

Morgan vs.
Utah Code

Ann. §65-1-76 requires:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
26

the

Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
The

trial

court; should

rewrite the parties' lease.

\\< L be

allowed

to

unilaterally

If there is an ambiguity, the trial

court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty
provisions.

POINT IV.

ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE.

The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be asserted

against a state government

in matters affecting

public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its
governmental capacity.

Estoppel is not applied in matters where

an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of
unauthorized acts of State officials.

Atlantic Richfield Company

vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
There

are

many

good

reasons

for

this

rule

including

safeguarding public funds and interests which are subject to
changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and
employees.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d

715 at 718 (Utah 1982).

Restrictions on the application of legal

doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the
area

of

eminent

possession.

domain, Utah Code Ann.

§78-34-3

or adverse

There are even greater restrictions and protections

when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the
constitutional requirements and important policies.
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands
and is subject to estoppel in only limited circumstances; and (c)
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the undisputed facts wii 1 no! support a finding of estoppel.
A.
The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were
estopped as a matter of law from enforcing the terms of the lease
and obtaining full value for the trust fund.
considered whether estoppel

Courts which have

should be applied

when

it would

reduce the income t o school trust lands have consistently held
that the important public policy of providing full value to the
trust

lands

prohibits

the

imposition

of

a defense

such as

estoppel.
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok.
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when
issuing a certificate
allowing
rights

reformation

of purchase for land.
of the

to the State, held

documents
that

The Court, in

restoring

the State

was

the mineral
acting

in a

governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the
State's

trust

responsibilities

mineral rights.

to

allow

divestiture

of

the

Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser

is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and
is

charged

with

notice

that

the

State

could

only

act

in

compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee.
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee
when he issued the deed and failed tc reserve the mineral rights.
.Id. at 1199.

The State employee in this case had no authority,
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either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lowei
than the prevailing federal rate.
In State vs. Northwest Maanesite Company,

182 P.2d

643

(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on
the basis of net profits.

That representation was contrary to

the statute and the lease.

The Court, in holding that the lessee

was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity,
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendants payment of money
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled
to interest on the unpaid royalties.

Id. at 662.

In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled
to

certain water

rights.

The Montana

Supreme Court denied

Defendants7 claim and found that the water rights were part of
of the school trust lands of the State of Montana.

The Court

held that there were three important principals governing school
trust lands. Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created
a trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act
was to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles;
and (3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions.
It further held that Courts are to be very protective of the
trust and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust
30

corpus,

Ttie court" also found that an interest in State land

cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that, any use
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible.
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a
different set of rules than other public lands.
The holdings

Id. at 956.

in the above cases are consistent with the

manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel
against the State.

The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel

cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate
State statute.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company,

supra at 719.

In the case at hand, the application of an

estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the
Constitution of Utah.

Even if the Court determines that estoppel

could apply, the Plaintiff must prove that estoppel is necessary
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715 at 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 at
694 (Utah 19 / •») .

In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company

the Court stated:
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
whether it appears that the facts may be found with
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered
31

is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.
Id. at 720.
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its
assets.

To allow the application of estoppel in this case would

defeat that purpose.

As pointed out in Utah State University vs.

Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied
when it would violate such an important public purpose.

See

also, Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P. 2d 1376 at 1378 (Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling
based on estoppel and stating

lf

[w]e are extremely reluctant to

apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in
a public highway by a governmental entity").
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved.

An

assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiff to prove
with certainty that paying royalties at $.15 per ton is a higher
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its
assets.
718.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at

The injustice in this case is the trial court's application

of estoppel giving the Plaintiff a windfall at the expense of the
school trust fund.
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B.
Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very
Circumstances When The State Is Acting
Governmental Capacity,

Limited
In Its

The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its
governmental

proprietary capacity when managing school trust

lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943).

This Court

held:
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood,
as a condition to the right of the State to be born,
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life
as a government.
It must therefore be held by the
state in a governmental capacity.
Id. at 343.
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the
State

of

Utah

functions

and

regarding

the distinction

governmental

retains its immunity.

functions

as

between

proprietary

to which

the State

A governmental function has been defined

as a function which is performed only by a government entity and
is essential to the core of governmental activity.

Cox vs. Utah

Land and Mortgage Corporation, 716 P.2d 783 at 785 (Utah 1986),
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293 at 294
(Utah 1986).
definit ion

The Utah Legislature has recently expanded that
to

include

governmental activities.

non-essential

as

well

as

essential

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a).

The

management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon
33

the

State

by

Constitution.

a

federal

statute

and

accepted

by

the Utalr.

It is an activity that can only be performed by

the State.
As

already

established,

the

Court

must

be

extremely

reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its
governmental capacity.

When public lands are involved, still

more restrictive rules govern.

For example, adverse possession

cannot be applied against public lands.
P.2d 697 at 698 (Utah 1934).

Peterson vs. Johnson, 34

Great protection is given to trust

lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the
trust and violate the State's governmental powers.

Department of

State Lands vs. Pettibone. supra at 952.
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities
imposed by the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood.

Estoppel

cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this
important government capacity.
c

*
The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support A Finding Of
Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was
estopped

from

collecting

delinquent

royalty

payments.

Its

finding that the Plaintiff had relied on the State's lack of
protest and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate of
$.15 per ton was wrong.

The facts upon which reliance and
34

detriment

could

Defendants.

correctly

be

founded

were

disputed

by

the

Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it was the

State that relied on the Plaintiff to pay the correct royalty
amount.

The Plaintiff had the duty to the State to calculate and

pay the correct royalty.

The State did not have a duty to

Plaintiff to collect the correct royalty although it has such a
duty to the school trust.
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the
Plaintiff must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3)
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of
the

real

facts;

(4)

made

with

the

intention

that

the

representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured.

Colman

vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 at 790 (Utah 1987).
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized
statements of a government employee.

Dansie vs. Murray City, 560

P.2d 1123 at 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hickel,
supra at 591.

If a person has the means to determine the actual

facts estoppel does not apply.
supra.

To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must

be substantial.
injury.
PSC

Morgan vs. Board of State Lands,

Paying what is owed under the lease is not an

Barnes vs. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs.

754

P.2d

41

(Utah

1988);

and

Utah

Department

Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d
35

of

270 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel•
It was the Plaintiff who was responsible to correctly report the
royalty

rate

and

payments.

It was

the

Plaintiff

who had

substantial dealings with the federal government and who was
aware of the increase in the federal royalty rate (R.397-399) and
it was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to accurately
report and accurately pay the correct royalty amount. (R.433)
The undisputed facts support a finding of estoppel against the
Plaintiff and not in favor of the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claimed that the discussions between the parties
regarding the lease adjustment and the failure of the State to
require adjustment in 1981 operated as an estoppel.

Adjustment

of the lease is a separate matter provided for in the recital
clause of the lease.

It has no bearing on the meaning and

enforcement of Article III which contains the royalty provisions.
After a hearing on July 8, 1981, the State Land Board ordered
that

certain

provisions

of

the

lease be

adjusted

including

increasing the royalty rate initially to 4% and after 5 years to
8%. (R.280)
to delay
settled

The Land Board, at the request of Plaintiff, agreed

implementation of the adjustment until the law was
on

whether

the

request

Plaintiff ceased production
finally resolved.

for

adjustment

was

timely.

in 1983 before those issues were

These facts do not support estoppel but rather

show that Plaintiff knew that the royalty rate had increased and
36

that the Land Board felt that Plaintiff should, in fairness to
the trust, pay a higher royalty rate.
Plaintiff also claims it would have not have mined the State
coal lease if the royalty rate had been increased and alleges
that it will incur a loss if required to pay the increased
royalty rate.

Defendants disputed those allegations.

Plaintiff

listed on its books a royalty of $1.10 per ton while only paying
the State $.15 ton. (R.400)

All costs are passed on by Plaintiff

to

and

its

parent

companies

consumers in the Midwest.
Economic

Analysis

of

eventually

the

utilities

and

Journal of Energy Law, Vol. 8, An

Utility

-

Coal

Company

Relationship's

(1987); In re Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, 40 P.U.R.
4th 537 (Indiana Public Service Comm. 1981).

Also during the

time period in question, Plaintiff was entering into leases with
the Federal Government for lands in the same mine complex and was
paying 8% royalties on those leases. (R.396)

Plaintiff will only

be required to pay what the lease requires.
constitute injury.
supra.

Such does not

Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams vs. PSC,

If this Court determines that the doctrine of estoppel

could apply in this case, then the matter should be remanded to
the trial court for trial with Plaintiff having the burden to
prove it has met the elements required for estoppel.
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CONCLUSION
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum
return on its disposition of school trust lands.

The State

implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate.

The decision of

the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands.
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director
of State Lands.
Respectfully submitted this ^0day of July, 1988.
NIELSEN ST/SENIOR
Attorneys/for Appellant

B. AlsLrStf

T\Y-tt&4uJiUa
McKeachnie
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ADDENDUM

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.
The p l a i n t i f f
summary

]i
)
]I

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
]
)
)
)

C i v i l N o . 14943

]
]
]
]
]

has moved

j u d g m e n t and h a s s u p p o r t e d

the C o u r t for p a r t i a l
the same b y their

Memorandum

of L e g a l P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s , A f f i d a v i t s a n d s u p p o r t i n g
documents.
filed

The defendants have objected

to t h e M o t i o n and h a v e

their M e m o r a n d u m of L e g a l P o i n t s a n d A u t h o r i t i e s and

supporting

documents and A f f i d a v i t s .

t h e r e is no d i s p u t e as to t h e m a t e r i a l
has concluded
partial

finds

that

f a c t s in t h i s case and

t h e r e f r o m t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f is e n t i t l e d to

summary

plaintiff!s

The Court

j u d g m e n t as p r a y e d

for a n d g r a n t s the

Motion.
The factual situation

is n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l to the

fact s i t u a t i o n as s h o w n in C a r b o n C a s e N o . 1 4 8 9 0 ,

Plateau

M i n i n g C o m p a n y v. T h e D i v i s i o n of S t a t e L a n d s a n d F o r e s t r y , et a

and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion in that
case to show the reasoning of the Court and the legal analysis
used by the Court in reaching its decision in this case.
The factual situation in this case is more supportive
of plaintifffs motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining
case in that there was an attempt by the defendants to
renegotiate the lease in question to a percentage of gross
value of coal produced in 1981.

That attempt was never pursued

by defendants and even withdrawn in January of 1982. Plaintiff,
at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral Resources
Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows:
"Should Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation
for lease adjustment, they may continue to operate under the
original Lease Agreement until otherwise advised."
The plaintiff responded in a letter to Mr. Blake on
January 7, 1982, as follows: "Blackhawk will continue to pay to
the State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of $.15 per ton in
compliance with Article 111(a) of the original Lease Agreement,
since the provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are
inapplicable at the present time."
Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted
without comment or objection the $.15 a ton in accordance with
Article 111(a) of the Lease.
2

The attorney for the plaintiff is directed t
re a formal judgment in accordance with this decis
DATED this

^P~/

^

da

y

3

of

April, 1988.

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

)
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
)
Delaware Corporation, and
)
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,]

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs .
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.

)
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Civil No. 14890

)

The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed in light of the parties course of performance;
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period;
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the
Board of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff,
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board.
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.
-2-

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts.

There is no dispute as to the fact

that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15,
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher. . . ."
That the lease was on a standard form provided by
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C
per ton.

The payment was received and retained by the State

without question or objection throughout the audit period and
prior thereto from sometime in 1965.

The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plateau and their predecessors in interest

filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15C per ton and
left the other column blank.
After the term of the lease had expired, December
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook,
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.

The

audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of
1985.
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed.

Based upon

the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales
Value of coal removed.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
-4-

the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
The royalty provision is divided into two parts.
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive
determination and provides for 15C per ton on coal produced
from the leased premises.
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and
provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at the

beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
V/hat time period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to .the
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?
-5-

For these reasons, the Court has concluded that
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors
necessary for self-execution could not independently be
ascertained by either party.
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it v/ould require
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment.
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty
under sub-paragraph (a).
Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a
different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted
construction to an ambiguous lease provision.
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
-6-

ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based
upon 15C a ton.

If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were

going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did
not do.

By their conduct and failure to perform this duty,

they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the
acceptable ro.yalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon,
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not
have done had they known that the defendants were going to
-7-

insist upon the 8% of value provision.

The great injustice

that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity
under the State Lease.
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the
State1s position and the contemplated change in the royalty
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result.
The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent
-8-

payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants1 iMotion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

,C-

BOYD) BtfNNELL,

-9-

O^^z^
Dj3strict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

by depositing the same in the United States

Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Clark B. Allred
Gayle F. McKeachnie
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Special Assistant Attorney General
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah
84078
David L. Wilkinson
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
David S. Christensen
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Hugh C. Garner
HUGH C. GARNER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
136 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
A. John Davis
PRUITTT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
Attorneys at Law
36 South State Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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Administrative Secretary
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Hugh C. G a r n e r - 1161
HUGH C. GARNER & ASSOCIATES, P . C .
136 South Main S t r e e t
S u i t e 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-5660
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A. John Davis - 0825
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
36 South State Street
Suite 1850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-8446
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
*

v.

*

THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, Director of the
Division of State Lands and
Forestry, THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Natural
Resources,

JUDGMENT

*
it

*

C i v i l No. 14943

*
*
*

Defendants.
Plaintiff has filed its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, together with its Supporting Memorandum of Points
and Authorities; Defendants have filed their Memorandum in

2
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion.

Plaintiff is represented by

Hugh C. Garner; Defendants are represented by their counsel Gayle
F. McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred.

The court having considered

the memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties and having
previously, on April 21, 1988f issued its Memorandum Decision on
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
NOW THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff owes no royalties, penalties or interest

to Defendants on State of Utah coal lease No. ML-18148 as
demanded in Defendants' October 15, 1985 Royalty Audit Report.
2.

The judgment signed by this court in this case is a

final order and judgment from which an appeal may proceed.
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys1
fees in connection with this case.
DATED this

//~

da

Y of«*£**^ 1988.

BY THE COURT:

BOYD BUNNELL

istrict—Court Judg^z

3
The above judgment was prepared by Hugh C. Garner of
and for Hugh C. Garner & Associates, P.C., attorney for
Plaintiff, and was, prior to execution by the court and pursuant
to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah, submitted to the following on this
26th day of April, 1988.
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
David S. Christensen, Esq.
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq.
Clark B. Allred, Esq.
Nielsen & Senior
363 East Main Street
Vernkl, Utah 84078

MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION
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MINERAL LEASH NO.
GRANT:
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Lease for

COAL
THIS INDENTURE O F ! EASE A N D AGREEMENT entered Into in duplicate this l t t b l l . . day of
E^nV^^y.
by and between the STA'l E LAND BOARD, acting in hoiialf of the Stnte of Utah, hereinafter cnlled the Lessor, and

, 19.J.M

CARTON DEra.ornFirr canrMir

I\ 0. Dox 506
Holp *r, Utah

party of the second part, hcieinafter cnlled the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to he observed by the Les'ee, ns hereinafter set forth, does licrcby Riant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive tight nnd privilege to mine, remove, nnd dispose of nil of the
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in

vf\XDOIl

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

AH of Section Thirty-bwo (32), Tcvmship Twalva (12) South, Hans'?
Salt Laic* Mori/Jinn,

r1

^^ (?) East,

containing a tota
acres, more or Ic-s, togcdier with the right to use nnd occupy so much of the surface of said land as
liiav be required for all purposes reasonably incidmr to the mining, removal, and di'posal of said minerals, according to the provisions of this
lease, for the period ending ten yraK aft»-r the first day of Januaiy next succeeding the date heteof and as long thereafter as said minerals may
be produced in commercial quantities from said land'-, or Lessee shall continue to make the payments requited by Article III hereof, upon
condition that nt the end of each twenty (20) year period succeeding the first day of the year in which this lease, is issued, such readjustment
of terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor may dctctrninc to he necessary in the interest of the State.

ARTICLE I
"Ibis lease is Granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations
nnd such operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board.

ARTICLE U
This lease covers only the mininp, removal, and di p-sal of the minerals specified in this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the
tlir Lessor of the discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein.
ARTICLE III
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights nnd ptivileges aforesaid, hereby covenants and agiees as follows:
FIRST: T o pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual
payments of rental shall be made in advance <M\ the 2nd day of January of •. h y a r , e x e p t the

'.'..

rental which is payable

on the execution of this lease. All rentals shall be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue.
S E C O N D : T o pay to Lessor quaiterly, v\\ or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(n) nt the rate of 15f* per (on of 2CC0 lbs. of coal produced fiom the leased premises and othctwise disposed cf, or
(b) at the rate, ptevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, fur federal lessees of land of similar character tinder coal leases issued by the United States at that time,
whichever is higher, nnd, commencing with the year beginning the January 1 following two ycats from the date hereof, to pay annual lov-ilty
of nt lc:>st S1.C0 multiplied by tli- number of acres hereby leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lessor may, nt any time after
the tenth Anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50Co.

y
"

Appendix 1

"

TJIIIU': To pirpntc and forward to the State l a u d Office, on or before the I5ih day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which
the mntetial is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, nnd
such other additional information ns the State Land Hoard may from time to time require.
LOUR i l l : To keep at the nunc office clear, accurate arid detailed maps en tracing cloth, en a scale n^t mote than 50 feet to the inch,
of the woikingn in each section of the leasrd lands and on the lauds adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land corner eo that th-y can be readily nnd correctly supeiimporcd, nnd to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such
maps nnd such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by rt licensed engineer nnd all maps certified
to by him.
r i F I I I : Mot to fence or otherwise male in:"-r^"ilr. to stock any water inn [dace on the premises without first obtaining the written consent
of Lessor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic
or irrigation use.
SIX 111: Not to assign this lea-^e or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained.

ARTICLE IV
l i r e Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease:
MRST: The right to permit for joint or several u-e such easements or rights of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased rs rnny
be necessary or nppropiinte to the working of these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits
or for other use.
SECOMU: The rifdit to use, lease, sell, or otherwise d i s u s e of the surface of fiaid lands or nny part thereof, tinder existing State laws
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar ns said surface is not necessnry for the Lcsce in the nu'ninp, removal, or disposal of the leased substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those lease I hereby, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted.

ARTICLE V
Upon failure or refuel of the Lesser to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by the Lessor nt the end of nny twentyyear period, such failure or refusal shall wotk n forfeiture of the lease nnd the same shall be canceled.

ARTICLE

VI

In ensr of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all utid'-r ground timbering "supports, shaft linings, rails nod
other installation-. nece r saiy for the support of undeii:roimd wordings of nny mines, and all rails or head frames and all installations which
cannot be innovcd without permanent injury to th- j*trnit-;'"^ and nil construct!' n and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation
for any mines, upon 01 in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the tcalty and shall revert to the Lessor withorit further consideration or
compensation. :.nd shall be lrlt by the Lessee in the lands.
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said l.-nds, and all buildings, machinery, equipment and toota (otlier thru
Installations to become the property of Lessor as alcove ptovided), shall be anil remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall be entitled
nnd may, within six (o) months after such expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of raid lease, or within such extension
time as may be gtanterl bv Lessor, remove from the snjd lands such personnl property and improvements, other than those items which
to remain die property of the Lessor ns above provided.

the
to,
of
are

Le.s-.ee shall, upon termination, of this Iras- or aban hutment of the leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such
part of the mine openings on the premises ns Lessor shall request be scaled.

ARTICLE VII
It shall be the rc-ponsibility of the Lessee to slope the sides of nil operations of n sutfnee nature to an angle of riot less than 45" or to
erect a barrier around such operation as the State Land l'oard may require. Such "'oping or fencing shall become a normal part of the operation of the lense so ns to keep pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shnll not constitute a hazard.

ARTICLE VIII
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of nny water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written perinfssron. Upon termination of this leas? (or any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the L'tnh State Engineer shnll revert to the
Lessor ns nn nppurtenance to the leased premises, nnd nil «uch rights acquired by other mean.i shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase
nt Lessee's acquisition cv^^, provided that Lessor shall he deemed to have rejected such offer if it does not accept the same within thirty
days nfter receipt thereof.

ARTICLE IX
AH of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding uj-njn the heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns of the Lessee.

ARTICLE

X

Lessee rnny terminate this lease at any time u p n gb-'im? three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor nnd upon payment of all
rents and royalti-s nnd other sums due and payable to th" Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preservation of the workings in such order nnd condition ns to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises.

ARTICLE XI
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall hnve the right nt all times to go in and upon the leased lands nnd premises, during the term of said
lease to inspect the work done nnd the progress thereof on said lands nnd the products obtained therefrom, nnd to post any notices on the
said land that it may deem fit and ptoper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the lessor to examine nil books nnd records
P^rtnininj? to operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the lame, If desired.
ARTICLE Xll

!
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CARBON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
COP-QOration^ _
,
"**^—.
President.

STATE O F UTAH

LESSE;

1

\ SS.
COUNT; OF

LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

1

On the

day of

19

, personally appeared before me

the signer of the above instrument, who duiy acknowledged to me that
Given under my hand and seal this

_

day of

executed the same.

19

My commission Expires:

"Notary Public, residing at:

STATE O F U T A H

COUNTY OF
On the

LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CARBON
19M

day of

who being duly sworn did say that he is an
in behalf of said corporation by resolution

J-\u)er, J .

19...™., personally appeared before me

\kL9jL

Diarnnnti

officer of ...C.ar.?ao.n...I).e..Y.elaprie.n.t....C..Qmp.n,J.t)X
and that said
Jorn?s
J
.
^
i
a
manti
of its Board of Directors, and said

instrument was signed
cknov.

edged to me that snid corporation executed the same.

Given under my hand and seal this

My commission

day of

M.i r e h

i9.i°.

Expires:

Notary Public, residing at:

Helper,

Utah

2/9/60

STATE O F U T A H

],.

C O U N T Y O F SALT LAKE

O n the
tr.-.:.:.-.."!
day of
...... 19...':..„, personally appeared before me Frank J. Allen, who beinp by me dul
y sworn ma
say that he is the Director of the State Lnnd lioard of the State of Utah and that said instrument was siened in behalf of said Board by
rcsoiution of the Board, and snid Fiank j . Allen acknowledged to me thnt snid Bonrd executed the fame in behalf of the State of Utah.

Given under my hand and seal this

.!.

day of

/.'.

'V
My commission Expires: vs" /y''/c^

Jl-

.!-

„.L... 19

J^^aJ

—.

Nouiry Public, residing at:

^> ,f
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